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SIMON BOLIVAR AND THE AGE OF REVOLUTION* 
1 
Bolivar spoke with great eloquence and precision to the Congress of 
Angostura. It was there that he described the Spanish American revolution 
as he saw it: 
A republican government, that is what Venezuela had, has, and should have. 
Its principles should be the sovereignty of the people, division of powers, civil 
liberty, prohibition of slavery, and the abolition of monarchy and privileges. 
We need equality to recast, so to speak, into a single whole, the classes of men, 
political opinions, and public custom.1 
These few words not only sum up the Liberator's hopes for the new Vene-
zuela; they also describe to perfection the model of revolution developed 
in the western world since 1776. 
The second half of the eighteenth century was an age of revolutionary 
change in Europe and America, a time of struggle between the aristo-
cratic and the democratic concept of society, between monarchical and 
republican systems of government. Reformers everywhere put their 
faith in the philosophy of natural rights, proclaimed ideas of popular 
sovereignty, and demanded written constitutions based on the principle of 
the 'separation' of powers. The concurrence of these radical movements 
and their culmination in the North American and French revolutions 
have led some historians to see in the period a common pattern of radical 
reform, an Atlantic revolution in which political principles were trans-
mitted from one part to another and the basic common denominator was a 
search for specifically democratic change.2 The thesis of a single great 
democratic revolution, however, ignores a number of important differ-
ences between the various movements, not least between those inside and 
those outside Europe, and it underestimates the strength and endurance of 
the counter-revolution. Democracy, moreover, was not the only medium 
of change. 
This was the age of absolutism, when monarchs too looked for change 
but sought it in other directions. Their object was to make themselves as 
absolute in practice as they were in theory, in order to overcome resistance 
to modernisation, to defeat rivals for power such as the Church, and to 
survive in a world of international conflict. Some rulers attempted to 
reform their government and administration, and in the process they 
began to employ a professional bureaucracy, to improve the flow of in-
formation, and to perfect the financial machinery. To what extent were 
they influenced by the ideas of the time? Was the new absolutism a servant 
of enlightenment or convenience? The programme was informed by a spirit 
of empiricism and responded to needs rather than ideas. It is true that 
rulers invoked new theoretical justification for their position, whether it 
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was the contractual theory of Locke, or the theory of 'legal despotism' 
advanced by the Physiocrats, who saw monarchy as justified by its func-
tions; these were to defend liberty and property, and if it was to do this 
effectively it needed strong legislative and executive powers. But on the 
whole it is difficult to trace a consistent pattern of Enlightenment ideas in 
the monarchies of the time, which continued to operate within the existing 
framework of authority and hierarchy. 
The political ideas of the Enlightenment were far from systematic, but a 
number of characteristic themes can be observed. Human government was 
by natural rights and social contract. Among the basic rights were liberty 
and equality. These could be discerned by reason, and reason, as opposed 
to revelation and tradition, was the source of all human knowledge and 
action. Intellectual progress should be unhindered by religious dogma, and 
the Catholic Church was identified as one of the principal obstacles to 
progress. The object of government was the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number, happiness being judged to a large extent in terms of 
material progress. The aim was to increase wealth, though different means 
were envisaged, some advocating state control of the economy, others a 
system of laissez-faire. The success of the philosophes in propagating their 
ideas - and in silencing their opponents - concealed a number of flaws and 
inconsistencies in their view of the world. One of the blind spots of the 
Enlightenment was nationalism, whose embryonic forms it failed to detect 
and whose demands it did not recognise. Another was social structure and 
change. The Enlightenment was not essentially an instrument of revol-
ution; it bestowed its blessing on the existing order of society, appealing 
to an intellectual elite and an aristocracy of merit. While it was hostile to 
entrenched privilege and to inequality before the law, it had little to say on 
economic inequalities or on the redistribution of resources within society. 
It was for this reason that it could appeal to absolutists as well as to con-
servative democrats, while to those interested in colonial liberation it 
remained virtually silent. 
The political and intellectual movements of the time were marked by 
diversity rather than unity. The concept of a single revolution inspired by 
democracy and nurtured on the Enlightenment does not do justice to the 
complexity of the period, nor does it discriminate sufficiently between 
minor currents of revolution and the great wave of change unleashed by 
the most powerful and radical movements of all. The age of revolution 
was that of the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution. The 
former, which started in Britain, was responsible for the growing economic 
ascendancy of the bourgeoisie in early nineteenth-century Europe, while 
the latter was responsible for its political preponderance. This fcdual 
revolution' was the key to historical change in the years between 1789 and 
1848. Tf the economy of the nineteenth century world was formed mainly 
under the influence of the British Industrial Revolution, its politics and 
ideology were formed mainly by the French. Britain provided the model 
for its railways and factories, the economic explosive which cracked open 
the traditional economic and social structures of the non-European world; 
but France made its revolution and gave them their ideas.3. Yet even this 
conceptual framework does not accommodate all the liberation move-
ments of the time, and it cannot provide a precise place for the movement 
led by Bolivar. 
The fact is that the revolutions for independence in Spanish America 
did not conform exactly to political or social trends in Europe. Even 
the most liberal thinkers were guarded in their response to the French 
Revolution. As Miranda observed in 1799, We have before our eyes 
two great examples, the American and the French Revolutions. Let us 
prudently imitate the first and carefully shun the second'.4 No doubt first 
impressions had raised greater hopes, and many young Creoles were at-
tracted by the ideas of liberty and equality and by the war against tyrants. 
But the more radical the French Revolution became the less it appealed 
to the creole elite. They saw it as a monster of extreme democracy and 
anarchy, which, if admitted into America, would destroy the social order 
which they knew. It was only indirectly and in terms of military and 
strategic consequences that events in France produced repercussions in 
Spanish America, first by drawing the hostility of Britain on France's ally 
Spain after 1796 and thus isolating the metropolis from its colonies, and 
then, in 1808, by precipitating a crisis of legitimacy and power in America 
when France invaded Spain and removed the Bourbons. 
The influence of Britain also requires careful definition. It was from 1780 
to 1800 that the industrial revolution became really effective and Britain 
experienced an unprecedented growth of trade, based mainly upon factory 
production in textiles. Virtually the only limit on the expansion of British 
exports was the purchasing power of their customers, and this depended on 
what they could earn from export to Britain. These factors help to explain 
the particular attraction of the Spanish American market. As there was 
little possibility of rival industrialisation among the impoverished people of 
the Hispanic world, it was a captive market. And although it produced only 
a limited range of commodity exports capable of earning returns in Britain, 
it had one vital medium of trade, silver. Britain therefore valued her trade 
with Spanish America and sought to expand it. The market was vulnerable 
to British penetration, especially in the event of international crisis, and 
the consumers were willing. During times of war with Spain, while the 
British navy blockaded Cadiz, British exports supplied the consequent 
shortages in the Spanish colonies. A new economic metropolis was dis-
placing Spain in America. It would be an exaggeration to say that British 
trade undermined the Spanish empire, or that Spanish Americans took 
up arms only to end the Spanish monopoly. But the invidious contrast 
between Britain and Spain, between growth and stagnation, between 
strength and weakness, had a powerful effect on the minds of Spanish 
Americans. And there was a further psychological refinement. If a world 
power like Britain could lose the greater part of its American empire, by 
what right did Spain remain in the New World? 
Yet the North American revolution found only a distant echo in the 
subcontinent. In the years around 1800, of course, the influence of the 
United States was exerted by its mere existence, and the close example 
of liberty and republicanism remained an active inspiration in Spanish 
America. The proclamations of the Continental Congress, the works of 
Thomas Paine, the speeches of John Adams, Jefferson and Washington all 
circulated among Creoles, and many of the precursors and leaders of 
independence visited the United States and saw free institutions at first 
hand. But Spanish American independence was not a projection of the 
American Revolution, nor was there a direct influence from one to the 
other. North American government, especially federalism, drew a very 
mixed response from the new republics and was anathema to Bolivar. 
The object of the present paper is to study the ideas and policy of Bolivar 
in the framework of the age of revolution. My purpose is to place his 
thought in a wider context, to view it against its historical background, and 
to observe it in action after 1810. In doing this I do not propose to relate 
Bolivar to individual thinkers or to specific movements. My intention is not 
to seek the origins of his thought, or to assess the political influences which 
the Enlightenment and the French Revolution may have exerted upon 
him, much less to measure the impulse given to events in the Hispanic 
world by revolutionary change outside. 
We can obviously see in Bolivar varied evidence of the age in which he 
lived, of Enlightenment and democracy, of absolutism and even counter-
revolution. According to Daniel Florence O'Leary, his aide and confidant, 
he was especially impressed by Hobbes and Spinoza, while he also studied 
Helvetius, Holbach and Hume.5 We know too that the works of Montes-
quieu and Rousseau left their imprint on him. But it does not follow that 
these thinkers exercised a precise or exclusive influence. Bolivar read 
widely in order to educate himself, to acquire knowledge in general rather 
than a specific programme. It is true that his reading of the philosophers 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was a major and probably a 
preferred part of his education, but it seems more likely to have con-
firmed his scepticism than created it, to have enlarged his liberalism than 
implanted it. Precision in tracing ideological influences and intellectual 
causation is notoriously elusive, not least in a leader like Bolivar, whose 
ideas were a means to action and whose actions were based on many 
imperatives, political, military and financial, as well as intellectual. The 
temptation inherent in seeking intellectual origins and influences is to 
overemphasise those aspects in which the influence of the past is shown, 
and by linking a thinker too closely with his predecessors to obscure his 
real originality. Bolivar was not a mere creature of his age, not a slave to 
French or North American examples. His own revolution was unique, and 
in developing his ideas and his policies he followed not the models of the 
western world but the needs of his own America. 
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Revolutionary change in the period 1776-1848 was accompanied by 
criticism of the ancien regime. This tendency was reflected too in the 
thought of Bolivar. In the struggle between aristocracy and democracy, 
between monarchy and republic, between conservatism and liberalism, 
he was to be found on the side of enlightenment, invoking the favoured 
concepts of sovereignty of the people, natural rights, and equality, while 
defending 'constitution', l aw ' , and 'liberty', though his understanding of 
these things was not conventionally democratic. With the exception of the 
English version, he was critical of monarchy in general and particularly 
hostile to its adoption in Spanish America. 'I do not favour American 
monarchies', he said, and gave two reasons.6 Republics directed their 
energies to internal prosperity, not to expansion or conquest, whereas a 
king always sought to increase his power and wealth by increasing his 
territorial possessions, a reason which may have reflected his reading of 
the dynastic wars of the eighteenth century but which curiously ignored 
the record of the French republic. Secondly, he rejected constitutional 
monarchy, which he saw as a combination of aristocracy and democracy. 
Although Britain had achieved wealth and power with such a government, 
it was beyond the political capacities of Spanish Americans. If these were 
the only reasons for Bolivar's republicanism, it would lack credibility. His 
basic conviction, however, was that the sovereignty of the people and the 
right to freedom and equality could find expression only in a republic; this 
was an instinct rather than an argument. 
The aristocratic concept of society drew less criticism from Bolivar. 
On more than one occasion he expressed great admiration for the English 
aristocracy and the House of Lords, i t s aristocracy is immortal, indes-
tructible, tenacious, and as durable as platinum'; above all it was useful 
and active in the service of arms, commerce, scholarship and politics.7 
No doubt Bolivar's view of the English aristocracy was that of a distant 
observer and of one who had seen at closer quarters the Spanish court and 
nobility. The concept of noblesse oblige, moreover, was something which 
he envied for Spanish America. The philosophes had not been uniformly 
hostile to aristocracy (or indeed to monarchy), and like them Bolivar 
tended to take society as he found it. While he was socially aware, he was 
not a social revolutionary. He was a product and to some extent a spokes-
man of the landowning elite; in criticising the colonial monopoly and 
economic restrictions imposed by Spain, these were the interests which he 
voiced.8 Yet he did not identify completely with his class, and his political 
judgement was superior to that of the Venezuelan oligarchy. He realised 
that independence could not be won without gaining the support of the 
dispossessed and widening the social base of his following. So he sought a 
mean between aristocracy and anarchy, i imagine that in Lima the rich 
will not tolerate democracy, nor will the freed slaves and pardos accept 
aristocracy. The former will prefer the tyranny of a single man, to avoid the 
tumult of rebellion and to provide at least a peaceful regime'.9 Independ-
ence, he argued, would have to avoid falling into 'demagogic anarchy or 
monocratic tyranny'. 
The Church as well as the state had come under the scrutiny of the 
Enlightenment. Deistic and free-thinking writings, first introduced from 
England, acquired a new lease of life in France in the eighteenth century. 
When deism emerged into the open with the writings of Voltaire and the 
Encyclopedists, it was not a precise theology but a vague form of religion 
used as a sanction for politics and morals and a cover against the charge of 
atheism. The growth of scepticism in religion and the specifically anti-
Christian offensive of the philosophes not only represented intellectual 
positions; they also supported proposals to increase the power of the 
state over the church and even to create a state religion which, however 
spurious, was regarded as necessary for public order and morals. Bolivar 
seems to have been marked by some of these influences, though whether 
they totally destroyed his belief it is impossible to say. He usually handled 
the subject of religion with caution, but beneath his outward observance 
there was an element of scepticism, and in private he ridiculed religion. 
Did he then reject the religion as well as the government of the ancien 
regime? According to O'Leary, an Irish Catholic, Bolivar was ka complete 
atheist', who believed only that religion was necessary for government, and 
whose attendance at Mass was purely formal; this is corroborated by other 
evidence that the books which Bolivar read in church were not always 
religious.10 O'Leary also hints that Bolivar's tutor, Simon Rodriguez, had 
deliberately instilled in the young man a philanthropic and liberal view of 
life rather than a Christian one, and had introduced Bolivar to the works of 
eighteenth-century sceptics and materialists: kYet in spite of his scepticism 
and consequent irreligion, he always believed it necessary to conform to 
the religion of his fellow citizens'. 
Bolivar, in other words, was too political to allow his basic objectives 
to be jeopardised by gratuitous anti-clericalism, much less by overt free-
thinking. Whenever he rebuked the clergy it was for specific actions. The 
earthquake of 1812 was openly exploited by priests who preached against 
the republic, in Bolivar's view, 'sacrilegiously abusing the sanctity of their 
office', and displaying a fanaticism on behalf of the royalist cause out 
of pure opportunism. On other occasions too he was angered by the 
royalism of the clergy. He subsequently did what he could to disestablish 
the church, but in a deeply Catholic society he had to move carefully. In his 
speech to the constituent congress of Bolivia he explained that his Bolivian 
Constitution excluded religion from any public role, and he came close to 
saying that it was a purely private concern, a matter of conscience, not of 
politics. He specifically declined to provide for an established church or a 
state religion: T h e sacred precepts and dogmas are useful, enlightening 
and metaphysical in their nature; we should profess them but this is a 
moral duty, not a political one' .1 3 The state should guarantee freedom of 
religion, without prescribing any particular religion. Bolivar thus defended 
a view of toleration in which religion exists on its own strength and merits 
without the support of legal sanctions. He never subscribed to Rousseau's 
idea of a civil religion, designed for its social and political utility, and 
intended to take the place of existing churches. Bolivar was a man of ideas 
but he was also a realist; and we must leave the final word to him. During 
his last dictatorship he decreed specific measures - the imposition of 
Roman Catholic teaching in education and the restoration of dissolved 
religious houses - in favour of the traditional religion of Spanish America. 
On his death-bed he received the Last Sacraments and died a Catholic, in 
the Church 4in whose faith and belief I have lived'.14 Yet there are few 
traces of that belief in his political thought. 
In the absence of strong religious motivation, Bolivar seems to have 
developed a philosophy of life based on utilitarianism. The evidence for 
this comes not simply from his formal contacts with James Mill and Jeremy 
Bentham, though these undoubtedly existed, but from his own writings, 
where the greatest happiness principle emerges as the driving force of 
politics. Spanish Americans, he argued, held unrealistic expectations of 
proceeding directly from servitude to freedom, from colony to indepen-
dence. He attributed this to their eager search for happiness: i n spite of 
the lessons of history, South Americans have sought to obtain liberal, even 
perfect institutions, doubtless out of that universal human instinct to aspire 
to the greatest possible happiness, which is bound to follow in civil societies 
founded on the principles of justice, liberty and equality'.15 A few years 
later, in his Angostura Address, he stated that 4the most perfect system 
of government is that which results in the greatest possible measure of 
happiness and the maximum of social security and political stability'.16 
In 1822, writing to the vice-president of Colombia, Francisco de Paula 
Santander, at a time when there were fears that congress might revise the 
constitution of 1821, Bolivar observed: T h e sovereignty of the people is 
not unlimited, because justice is its base and perfect utility sets limits to 
it'.17 We may take this as further evidence that Bolivar was still following 
Bentham. Others went further; Santander and his liberal associates sought 
to incorporate Bentham's treatises into the study of law in Colombia, until 
their efforts were overtaken by a conservative reaction. 
The works of Bentham came under attack from the clergy and other 
conservatives, and the materialism, scepticism and anti-clericalism of 
the English philosopher were declared harmful to the Catholic religion. 
Bolivar was forced into painful decisions. Convinced by now that the 
constitution and laws of Colombia were excessively liberal and threatened 
the dissolution of society and the state, and pressed by conservatives on 
the specific issue of Bentham, Bolivar had to take sides. In 1828 he for-
bade the teaching of Bentham's Tratados de Legislacion Civil y Penal 
in the universities of Colombia.18 The attempt to assassinate him in 
September 1828 and the implication of university personnel in the con-
spiracy further convinced him that university students were being danger-
ously indoctrinated, and his government issued a circular on public 
education (20 October 1828) denouncing the study of 'principles of legis-
lation' by authors 'like Bentham and the others' and ordering that these 
courses be replaced by the study of the Roman Catholic religion. The 
period of his dictatorship, however, and the exceptional circumstances 
surrounding it are not the only test of Bolivar's political ideas, and the fact 
remains that he never abandoned his guiding principles. 
Bolivar's basic objectives were liberation and independence, and his 
criticism of the ancien regime was conditioned by these. Liberty, he said, is 
'the only object worth the sacrifice of a man's life'.19 But for Bolivar liberty 
did not mean simply freedom from the absolutist state of the eighteenth 
century, as it did for the Enlightenment, but freedom from a colonial 
power, to be followed by true independence under a liberal constitution. 
'It is not enough that our armies be victorious and our enemies evicted, or 
that the whole world recognise our Independence; it is even more essential 
that we become free under the auspices of liberal laws, deriving from the 
most sacred source, namely the will of the people'.20 The second stage 
would take more than one generation to accomplish. Meanwhile, as an 
immediate objective, he fought for liberation from Spain; this was a liberty 
with a dimension unknown to European thought. 
European intellectuals and statesmen of the eighteenth century were 
blind to the existence of nationality as a historical force. The cosmo-
politanism of the philosophes was hostile to national aspirations; the 
majority of these thinkers disliked national differences, ignored national 
sentiment, and seem to have been totally unaware of the possibility of new 
and embryonic nationalities or of any right of colonial independence. The 
English conservative theorist and statesman Edmund Burke came close to 
developing a theory of national self-determination, but he was far from 
admitting that colonists had rights to independence as a separate nation. 
Theory of nationality was taken further by Rousseau, who argued that if 
a nation did not have a national character it must be given one by appro-
priate institutions and education. Rousseau, moreover, was the leading 
intellectual defender of political freedom against the despotic monarchies 
of the eighteenth century. But even he did not apply his ideas to colonial 
peoples. And the fact remains that few of the eighteenth-century pro-
gressives were revolutionaries. Neither Montesquieu, nor Voltaire, nor 
Diderot went to the logical conclusion of advocating revolution; even 
Rousseau stopped short of sanctioning violent political change. 
The Enlightenment, therefore, did not reach the point of applying 
the idea of freedom and equality to relations between peoples, and did 
not produce a concept of colonial liberation or war of independence. It 
needed the makers of North American and Spanish American indepen-
dence to do this. In most parts of the Atlantic world post-Enlightenment 
liberalism was not in itself an effective agent of emancipation. Jeremy 
Bentham was one of the few reformist thinkers of the time to apply his 
ideas to colonies, to advocate independence as a general principle, and to 
expose the contradiction inherent in regimes which practised liberalism at 
home and imperialism abroad. But Bentham was exceptional, and most 
liberals remained no less imperialist than conservatives. This need not 
surprise us if we remember that liberal political ideas tended to appeal to 
the new bourgeoisie, many of whom were involved in industry and trade, 
and were ready to promote formal or informal empire in order to secure 
captive markets. This is nowhere more clear than in the Cortes of Cadiz 
and the Spanish Constitution of 1812, which, under the influence of the 
business community of Cadiz as well as of Enlightenment ideas, firmly 
rejected any idea of independence for Spanish America. 
Bolivar, therefore, could find little direct inspiration for ideas of eman-
cipation either from European or from Hispanic sources. He was not, 
of course, the first to construct a justification of independence. In North 
America Richard Bland, John Adams, the declarations of the Continental 
Congress, and the Declaration of Independence itself had all made import-
ant contributions to the colonial debate. But Bolivar was convinced that 
North American experience was different from that of his own people and 
could not provide a useful model. He had to design his own theory of 
national self-determination, and this was a contribution to, not a mere 
copy from, the age of revolution. 
Bolivar's theory of liberation is to be found mainly in his Jamaica 
Letter.21 This was an exercise in applied liberalism rather than a theoret-
ical discourse, though we can observe certain political and moral assump-
tions - that people have natural rights, that they have a right to resist 
oppression, that nationalism has its own imperatives, that deprivation of 
office and of economic freedom justifies rebellion. He began by arguing 
that the unjust policy and oppressive practice of Spain severed the ties with 
America and authorised the sixteen million Americans to defend their 
rights, the more so when counter-revolution brought increased oppression. 
These rights were natural rights, granted by God and nature. It was true 
that 4a principle of affinity' had bound Americans to Spain, and this could 
be seen in the enduring habit of obedience, community of interest, of 
understanding and of religion, mutual goodwill and, on the part of Ameri-
cans, a regard for the birthplace of their forbears. But all these bonds were 
broken, as affinity changed to alienation and the elements of community 
turned into their opposites and became - though Bolivar did not use the 
word - signs of incipient nationalism. But there were problems of identity. 
Americans by birth, they were neither Indian nor European, but in an 
ambiguous position between usurped and usurpers. And under Spanish 
rule their political role was purely passive: 'America was denied not only 
its freedom but even an active and effective tyranny'. Most despotic rulers, 
he argued, at least had an organised system of oppression in which sub-
ordinate agents participated at various levels of administration. But under 
Spanish absolutism Americans were not allowed to exercise any functions 
of government or even of internal administration. Thus, he concluded, 
they were not only deprived of their rights but kept in a state of political 
infancy. 
Bolivar then proceeded to give significant examples of inequality and 
discrimination, arguing that Americans were deprived in particular of 
economic opportunity and public office. Americans were destined by Spain 
to be a source of labour and a consumer market. They were not allowed to 
compete with Spain and supply themselves, either in agricultural products 
or manufactured goods. They were allowed to be no more than producers 
of raw materials and precious metals, and the export of even these was 
controlled by the Spanish trading monopoly. Moreover, he added, this 
applied 'today, and perhaps to a greater extent than ever before', an 
observation which modern research confirms, showing as it does that by 
comercio libre Spain sought to expand its colonial trade and channel it 
more effectively through the peninsular monopolists. The new imperialism 
of the Bourbons also sought to restore to Spain domination over appoint-
ments. Bolivar states that Americans were barred from senior offices and 
prevented from acquiring any experience in government and administra-
tion. 'We were never viceroys or governors, save in the rarest of cases; 
seldom archbishops or bishops; never diplomats; among the military only 
subordinates... In brief, we were neither magistrates nor financiers and 
seldom merchants. ' Recent research concludes that Americans received 
public office (mainly through purchase) in considerable numbers in 1650-
1750 but were then restricted in a 'Spanish reaction' which Bolivar himself 
probably observed. Bolivar went further. He maintained that Americans 
possessed 'constitutional rights' to public offices, deriving from a pact 
between Charles V and the conquerors and settlers, whereby in return for 
their own enterprise and risks they received lordship over land and admin-
istration. As history the idea is questionable, but there is a contractual 
concept embedded in the argument which Bolivar sought to transplant in 
American soil. 
In the Jamaica Letter Bolivar consciously saw himself on the side of 
change against tradition, in favour of revolution against conservatism. It is 
characteristic of civil wars, he argues, to form two parties, 'conservatives 
and reformers' . The former are commonly the more numerous, because 
the weight of habit induces obedience to established powers; the latter are 
always fewer in number although more vocal and learned, so numbers are 
counterbalanced by moral force. Polarisation causes prolonged conflict, 
but he continues the struggle in hope, because in the war of independence 
the masses are following the reformers. The international situation, too, he 
saw in terms of division between conservatism and liberalism, between the 
Holy Alliance and, in effect, Great Britain. Speaking of America's 
isolation (in 1815) and the need for a sympathetic ally, he wrote: 'As soon 
as we are strong and under the guidance of a liberal nation which will lend 
us her protection, we will achieve accord in cultivating the virtues and 
talents that lead to glory'. 
Bolivar's view of the old regime and of revolutionary change was not 
that of a European or a North American, and there were basic limitations 
on the extent to which outside models could serve him. He lived in a world 
with a different history, capacity and social organisation, and worked 
among a people with different expectations. Political solutions and modes 
of government, he appreciated, must conform to American conditions and 
satisfy American needs. The government of Colombia, he thought, must 
be based 'on our own customs, our own religion and our own habits, and 
finally on our own origins and history. The laws enacted for Colombia have 
not had a salutary effect, for they are derived from foreign sources, entirely 
alien to our conditions'. The First Venezuelan Republic fell, he argued, 
because its government ignored the characteristics of the people; other 
imitations would fare equally badly. Americans were used to tyranny and 
accepted it, but they were ignorant of freedom, and it would be difficult to 
change this habit. T h e vestiges of Spanish domination will long be with 
us...the contagion of despotism infects the atmosphere about us'.22 He 
therefore specifically rejected French and North American models and 
recommended instead an adapted version of the British constitution, 
unperturbed apparently by the unreformed state of the latter and the 
criticisms levelled against it by philosophes and radicals alike. Such a 
compromise would admit freedom and keep anarchy at bay, and this was 
what he wanted for America. 
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Bolivar believed in liberty and equality, and these were the foundations of 
his revolution. From Montesquieu he inherited a hatred of despotism and a 
belief in moderate constitutional government, in the separation of powers 
and the rule of law. But liberty in itself is not the key to his political system. 
Indeed he distrusted theoretical concepts of liberty, and his hatred of 
tyranny did not lead him to the glorification of anarchy. 'Abstract theories 
create the pernicious idea of unlimited freedom', he said, and he was 
convinced that absolute liberty invariably deteriorated into absolute 
power. His search for freedom therefore was a search for equilibrium, and 
for what he called practical liberty, or social liberty, a mean between 
the rights of the individual and the needs of society. This was secured 
essentially by the administration of justice and the rule of law, so that the 
just and weak could live without fear, and merit and virtue could receive 
their due reward.23 He believed, with Rousseau, that only the law can be 
sovereign, and law is the result not of divine or despotic authority but of 
human will and the sovereignty of the people. 
Equality too was a right and an objective. There were two senses of 
equality in Bolivar's political thought. First, equality of Americans with 
Spaniards, of Venezuela with Spain. This equality was absolute, and was 
the basis of his argument for independence. Secondly, equality between 
Americans. European political theorists wrote for communities of relative 
social homogeneity and appealed to fairly distinct classes, such as the petty 
bourgeoisie favoured by Rousseau. Bolivar had no such advantage. He had 
to begin with more complex human material and to legislate for a society 
with a peculiar racial formation. Americans, he was never tired of saying, 
were neither European nor indigenous people but a mixture of Spanish, 
Africans and Indians. 'All differ visibly in the colour of their skin, a differ-
ence which places upon us an obligation of the greatest importance'.24 
This obligation was to correct the disparity imposed by nature and inherit-
ance, by making men equal before the law and the constitution. 'Men are 
born with equal rights to share the benefits of society', he observed, but 
obviously they do not possess equal talents, virtue, intelligence and 
strength. This physical, moral and intellectual inequality must be corrected 
by laws, so that the individual may enjoy political and social equality; thus 
by education and other opportunities an individual may gain the equality 
denied him by nature. It was Bolivar's opinion that 'the fundamental basis 
of our political system turns directly and exclusively upon the establish-
ment and practice of equality in Venezuela'.25 And he explicitly denied 
that this was inspired by France or North America, where in his opinion 
equality had not been a political dogma. The logic of his own principles led 
him to conclude that the greater the social inequality, the greater the need 
for legal equality. Among the practical steps which he envisaged was the 
extension of free public education to all the people and particular reforms 
for those sectors who were especially disadvantaged, such as the landless 
and the slaves. 
Liberty and equality, these were the essential objectives. But how could 
they be realised without sacrificing security, property and stability, those 
other rights by which society protected the persons and possessions of its 
citizens? In principle Bolivar was a democrat and he believed that 
government should be responsible to the people: 'only the majority is 
sovereign; he who takes the place of the people is a tyrant and his power is 
usurpation'.26 But Bolivar was not so idealist as to imagine that America 
was ready for pure democracy, or that the law could instantly annul 
inequalities of nature and society. 'Complete liberty and absolute 
democracy are but reefs upon which all republican hopes have 
foundered'.2 7 He spent his whole political career developing his principles 
and applying them to American conditions in his own version of the age of 
revolution. 
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The Cartagena Manifesto, the first major statement of Bolivar's ideas, 
analysed the failings of the First Republic and probed its political assump-
tions.28 He poured scorn on the adoption of a constitution so ill-adapted to 
the character of the people. Popular elections, he maintained, allowed the 
ignorant and ambitious to have their say and placed government in the 
hands of inept and immoral men who introduced the spirit of faction. 
Elections gave birth to parties, parties caused divisions, and divisions 'led 
us back into slavery'. People so young, so innocent of representative 
government and of education, could not be immediately transformed into 
democracies; their system of government could not advance beyond social 
realities. He insisted on unity and centralisation; a 'terrible power' was 
needed to defeat the royalists, and constitutional susceptibilities were 
irrelevant until peace and happiness were restored. This was the beginning 
of his permanent opposition to federalism, which he regarded as weak and 
complex, when America needed strength and unity. 
Six years later, with further campaigns behind him and the liberation of 
Venezuela and New Granada still to be completed, he called a national 
congress which met at Angostura on 15 February 1819, and to which he 
presented a plan of a constitution.30 His Angostura Address described an 
ideal democratic republic in the exact mould of the age of revolution: 
Venezuela, on breaking with Spain, has recovered her independence, her 
freedom, her equality, and her national sovereignty. By establishing a demo-
cratic republic, she has abolished monarchy, distinction, nobility, preroga-
tives, and privileges. She has declared for the rights of man and freedom of 
action, thought, speech, and the press.31 
These 'eminently liberal acts', as he called them, were possible because 
only in democracy was absolute liberty assured. But was this practicable? 
Democracy, he admitted, does not necessarily guarantee power, prosperity 
and permanence of a state. The federal system in particular makes for 
weak and divided government. It may be appropriate for the people of 
North America, who were raised on liberty and political virtues, but 
'it has never for a moment entered my mind to compare the position 
and character of two states as dissimilar as the Anglo-American and the 
Spanish American. It would be more difficult to apply to Venezuela the 
political system of the United States than it would be to apply to Spain that 
of England'. 
Laws, remarked Montesquieu, should be suited to the people for whom 
they are made. Rousseau maintained even more explicitly that con-
stitutions must take account of national character. Bolivar was no less 
insistent: constitutions must conform to the environment, character, 
history and resources of the people. This is the code we must consult, not 
the code of Washington'. So Bolivar still sought something corresponding 
to Spanish American reality, not a North American imitation. Spanish 
American reality was revealed in two aspects. The starting point was the 
socio-racial structure. Speaking of Venezuela, he observed: T h e diversity 
of social origin will require an infinitely firm hand and great tactfulness in 
order to manage this heterogeneous society, whose complex mechanism is 
easily impaired, separated, and disintegrated by the slightest controversy'. 
Secondly, the legislators would have to have regard for political experience 
and capacity. While Greece, Rome, France, England and North America 
all have something to teach in matters of law and government, yet he 
reminded them that the excellence of a government lies not in its theories 
or its forms, but in its being suited to the nature and character of the nation 
for which it is instituted. Basically he was a pragmatist: 'Do not adopt the 
best system of government, but the one that is most likely to succeed'.32 
Rather than build upon French or North American models, Bolivar 
recommended British experience, though cautioning against slavish 
imitation and any adoption of monarchy. With these qualifications, the 
British constitution seemed to be the one most likely to bring about 'the 
greatest possible good' for those who adopted it. It recognised popular 
sovereignty, division and balance of powers, civil liberty, freedom of 
conscience and of the press, and he recommended it as 'the most worthy to 
serve as a model for those who desired to enjoy the rights of man and all 
political happiness compatible with our fragile nature'. He began with a 
legislature modelled on the British Parliament, with two chambers, one a 
house of elected representatives, the other a hereditary senate. The latter, 
he thought, would remain independent of popular and government pres-
sures, and would protect the people against themselves. The senators 
would not be an aristocracy or a body of privilege, but an elite of virtue and 
wisdom produced not by electoral chance but by an enlighted education, 
specially designed for this vocation. Like the House of Lords in England, 
the Venezuelan senate would be 'a bulwark of liberty'. Yet the legislature, 
distinguished though it was, should not usurp power which properly be-
longed to the executive. Bolivar's executive, though elected, was powerful 
and centralised, virtually a king with the name of president. Again he 
looked to the British model, a strong executive at the head of government 
and the armed forces, but accountable to parliament which had legislative 
functions and financial control. 'A perfect model for a kingdom, for an 
aristocracy, or for a democracy'. Give Venezuela such an executive power 
in the person of the president chosen by the people or their representa-
tives, he advised, and you will have taken a great step towards national 
happiness. Add to this an independent judiciary and happiness would be 
complete, or almost complete, for Bolivar had a further proposal. 
To these three classical powers, Bolivar added a fourth of his own 
design, the poder moral, which would be responsible for training people in 
public spirit and political virtue. This idea was badly conceived and met 
with no response from his contemporaries, but it was typical of his search 
for a political education for his people, which he regarded as so important 
that it needed an institution to promote it. Was not the whole Angostura 
project anti-democratic? On the subject of the British constitution Bolivar 
parted company from the philosophes, among whom there was a strong 
bias against English politics for their corruption and unrepresentativeness, 
and from Rousseau too, who criticised the English system of government 
because parliament was independent of its constituents. The hereditary 
senate, one of the most controversial of all Bolivar's ideas, was an attempt 
to set a restraint on absolute democracy, which could be as tyrannical 
as any despot, but this transplanting of the English House of Lords to 
America - breaking his own 'American reality' principle - would simply 
have confirmed and prolonged the seigneurial social structure of 
Venezuela. The Congress of Angostura adopted a constitution embodying 
many of Bolivar's ideas, though not the hereditary senate or the moral 
power. But the new constitution was pure theory, for the war had still to be 
won. 
Once the liberation of New Granada and Venezuela was complete, a 
congress was held in Cucuta in 1821 to endow the new state of Colombia 
with a constitution. This created a strongly centralist state, a greater 
Colombia, comprising Venezuela, New Granada and Quito, the latter 
still to be liberated, united under a single government with its capital in 
Bogota. It was a conservative constitution, favouring the president over 
the legislature, and restricting the franchise to literates who had real 
property valued at a hundred pesos. But it was not without liberal content 
and it guaranteed the classical freedoms. Indeed Bolivar came to believe 
that it guaranteed too much freedom. 
After the liberation of Upper Peru, Bolivar was asked to draw up a 
constitution for Bolivia. In the last years of his life he was haunted by 
America's need for strong government, and it was in this frame of mind 
that, in 1826, he drafted the Bolivian constitution. His lifelong search for 
a balance between tyranny and anarchy now moved unerringly towards 
authority. As O'Leary explained, 'He sought a system capable of control-
ling revolutions, not theories which might foment them; the fatal spirit of 
ill-conceived democracy which had already produced so many evils in 
America had to be curbed if its effects were to be avoided'.33 
The new constitution preserved division of powers - legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial - and to these he added an elective power, by which 
groups of citizens in each province chose an elector, and the electing 
body then chose representatives and nominated mayors and justices. The 
legislative power was divided into three bodies - tribunes, senators and 
censors, all elected. The tribunes initiated finance and major policy issues; 
the senators were guardians of law and ecclesiastical patronage; and the 
censors were responsible for the preservation of civil liberties, culture 
and the constitution - a revival of his previous notion of a 'moral power'. 
The president was appointed by the legislature for life and had the right 
to appoint his successor; this Bolivar regarded as 'the most sublime inspi-
ration of republican ideas', the president being 'the sun which, fixed in its 
orbit, imparts life to the universe'.34 The president appointed the vice 
president, who held the office of prime minister and would, in the absence 
of the president, succeed the latter in office. Thus 'elections would be 
avoided, which are the greatest scourge of republics and produce only 
anarchy'. This was the measure of his disillusion seven years after 1819 
when, at Angostura, he had declared: 'The continuation of authority in the 
same individual has frequently meant the end of democratic governments. 
Repeated elections are essential in proper systems of government'. 
The rest of the constitution was not devoid of liberal details. It provided 
for civil rights - liberty, equality, security and property - and for a strong, 
independent judicial power. It abolished social privileges and it declared 
the slaves free. Bolivar himself claimed that the constitutional limitations 
on the president were 'the closest ever known', restricted as he was by his 
ministers, who in turn were responsible to the censors and scrutinised by 
the legislators. But this constitution was branded by its executive power, by 
the life president with right to choose his successor. It was this which 
outraged many Americans, conservatives as well as liberals. But Bolivar 
regarded this constitution as 'the ark of the covenant, an alliance between 
Europe and America, between soldier and civilian, between democracy 
and aristocracy, between imperialism and republicanism'.35 And he 
claimed that 'in it are combined all the advantages of federalism, all 
the strength of centralised government, all the stability of monarchical 
regimes'. 6 Indeed the life-term presidency was a source of particular pride 
and he considered it superior to hereditary monarchy, for the president 
appointed his successor (the vice-president), who was thus a ruler by merit 
and not by hereditary right. According to O'Leary, far from endangering 
freedom, the Bolivian Constitution was a great defence and guarantor of 
freedom, freedom from anarchy and revolution. This could be seen in the 
address accompanying the Constitution: 'the one who wrote it fought for 
the cause of liberty from his study with extraordinary eloquence, after 
having been its most renowned champion on the field of battle'.37 
The Bolivian Constitution should also be judged in terms of function. 
Bolivar never saw liberty as an end in itself. For him there was always a 
further question, freedom for what? He did not regard the role of govern-
ment as purely passive, defending rights, preserving privileges, exercising 
patronage. Government existed to maximise human happiness, and 
its function was to make policy as well as to satisfy interests. An active 
government had to be strong and free from constraints. New countries had 
a special need of strong government as an effective instrument of reform. 
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Bolivar conceived the American revolution as more than a struggle for 
political independence. He saw it also as a great social movement, which 
would improve as well as liberate, and would respond to the radical as well 
as the liberal demands of the age. Bolivarian reformism operated within 
the existing structure of society and did not attempt to advance beyond 
what was politically possible. But for the beneficiaries it promised signifi-
cant change. 
The Constitution of 1811 was egalitarian in the sense that it abolished all 
fueros and all legal expressions of socio-racial discrimination. It con-
firmed the suppression of the slave trade, but it preserved slavery. This 
was a political as well as a moral weakness. The defeats of 1812 and 1814 
were due in part to the ability of the royalists to rally slaves and pardos 
(mulattos) against the republicans, whom they identified with the slave-
owning Creole landowners. Bolivar quickly saw the need of fusing the 
Creole, pardo and slave rebellions into one great movement. He considered 
himself free of racial prejudice and one who fought for liberty and equality. 
This was the essence of independence: 'Legal equality is indispensable 
where physical inequality prevails'. The revolution would correct the 
imbalance imposed by nature and colonialism: previously 'the whites, by 
virtue of talent, merit and fortune, monopolised everything. The pardos, 
degraded to the most humiliating condition, had nothing.... But the revol-
ution has granted them every privilege, every right, every advantage'.38 
So Bolivar denounced and executed the pardo General Manuel Piar for 
inciting race war at a time when equality was already being granted to the 
coloured people. The measured programme of reform under Creole control 
was threatened by total subversion of the existing order, which, in the 
absence of ideas, experience and organisation among the pardos, could 
only lead to anarchy. While it was essential to widen the basis of the revol-
ution, this did not involve destroying the existing leadership: 'Who are the 
authors of the revolution? Are they not whites, the wealthy, the aristocracy 
and even the militia chiefs? What principles have these caudillos of the 
revolution proclaimed? The decrees of the republic are eternal monuments 
of justice and liberalism...liberty even for the slaves who were previously 
the property of the same leaders'.39 But the problem of race was not so 
easily resolved. 
Bolivar was an abolitionist, but he was not the first in Venezuela. The 
republican conspiracy of Manuel Gual and Jose Maria Espana in 1797 
proposed that 'slavery be immediately abolished as contrary to humanity', 
though it linked abolition with service in the revolutionary militia and with 
employment by the old master. The support of the Enlightenment was 
purely theoretical. From Montesquieu onwards the philosophes denounced 
slavery as useless and uneconomical as well as evil, but they did not make a 
crusade of abolition. No doubt Bolivar was also aware of contemporary 
movements in England and France, inspired as they were by humanitarian 
ideals and religious convictions. But the prime inspiration for his anti-
slavery initiative seems to have been his own innate sense of justice. He 
regarded it as 'madness that a revolution for liberty should try to maintain 
slavery'.40 His own instincts were reinforced by events. The Haitian 
President Petion's practical assistance drew from him a commitment to 
abolition, while his growing need for troops from a broader social base led 
him to tie emancipation to conscription. Decrees of 2 June and 21 June 
1816 proclaimed the freedom of the slaves on condition that they joined 
the republican forces.41 The response was negative. He liberated his own 
slaves, first on condition of military service in 1814, when about fifteen 
accepted, then unconditionally in 1821 when over a hundred profited.42 
Few hacendados followed his example, and the slaves themselves were 
hardly more enthusiastic. The Liberator believed that 'the slaves have lost 
even the desire to be free' , but the truth was that the slaves did not wish to 
exchange one form of servitude for another and were not interested in 
fighting the Creoles' war. Bolivar continued to argue that the Creole rulers 
and property-owners must accept the implications of the revolution, that 
the example of freedom was 'insistent and compelling', and that the 
republicans 'must triumph by the road of revolution and no other'.43 But 
the delegates at Angostura were afraid to unleash the slaves into free 
society, and after 1819 proprietors brought an end to wartime manu-
mission, small though this had been. Yet the problem would not go away, 
and Bolivar realised that it was impossible to return to pre-war conditions, 
that it could no longer be a question of resisting slave expectations but of 
controlling and directing them. 
The post-war Congress of Cucuta passed a complex law of manumission 
(21 July 1821), allowing for liberation of adult slaves; but it lacked teeth 
and depended for its operation on compensation financed from taxes, 
including death duties, levied on property owners.44 The Cucuta law also 
provided for the freeing of all children subsequently born to slaves, on 
condition that each child worked for his mother's owner until the age of 
eighteen. Thus liberation was thwarted by fear of economic and social 
consequences, and the law was weighted in favour of proprietors. O'Leary 
remarks that the laws of 1821 'did not satisfy Bolivar, who at all times 
pleaded for the absolute and unconditional abolition of slavery'.45 In 
practical terms he alone could not overcome the obstacles to abolition. His 
decree of 28 June 1827 reorganised the administration of the law but did 
not basically improve things. Some observers believed that in 1827 he 
agreed with Venezuela's rulers not to press for abolition.46 But Bolivar's 
last word on slavery is to be found not in a decree but in a constitution, that 
constitution which he regarded as Spanish America's last hope for peace 
and stability. The Bolivian Constitution declared the slaves free, and 
although the proprietors contrived to evade his intentions, Bolivar's plea 
for absolute and unconditional abolition was uncompromising. Slavery, he 
declared, was the negation of all law, a violation of human dignity and of 
the sacred doctrine of equality, and an outrage to reason as well as to 
justice.47 Bolivar's kinship with the age of revolution was unbroken. 
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The Indians of Colombia and Peru, unlike the Negroes and pardos, were 
not at the centre of Bolivar's preoccupations, but he was affected by their 
condition and determined to improve it. His Indian policy conformed 
closely to the principles of contemporary liberalism, designed as it was to 
individualise community land. Whether this policy was directly beholden 
to Trench Revolutionary and Benthamite doctrines' is less certain.48 
There was an element of improvisation in Bolivar's Indian policy which is 
difficult to reconcile with particular doctrines. At its most extreme the 
white liberal view of the Indians was that they should be hispanicised and if 
possible legislated out of existence by declaring them free of tribute and 
giving them private property in land. The Congress of Cucuta issued a law 
(11 October 1821) abolishing the tribute and all unpaid labour services, 
and making the Indians subject to the same taxes as other citizens. Appli-
cation of the law was delayed in Ecuador, for tribute from the Indian 
majority was regarded by Bolivar as too important for the war effort in 
Peru to be relinquished. The vital issue, however, was not tribute but land. 
The object was to make the Indian an independent individualist, instead 
of a protected peasant. Bolivar decreed (20 May 1820) the restoration of 
resguardo land in Cundinamarca to the Indians and its distribution to 
individual families; Indians were not to be employed without a formal 
wage.49 In the following months he received a series of complaints from 
Indians that, far from benefiting from the decree, they were defrauded of 
their rightful property and banished to marginal lands. Bolivar confirmed 
his previous orders and hoped for the best. The law of 11 October 1821 
ordered the liquidation of the resguardo system; it declared the Indians 
'restored' to their rights, and assigned resguardo land hitherto held in 
common to individual families in full ownership; this was to be done within 
five years. It was hoped that the Indians would become good property 
owners, agriculturalists and tax-payers. But the state did not have the 
means or the will to supply the infrastructure of agrarian reform, and it 
succeeded only in disrupting Indian community work and organisation 
which had depended on communal ownership, and soon the resguardos 
came to be irretrievably alienated. 
Bolivar sought to use his power in Peru from 1823 to inject further social 
and agrarian content into the revolution. His object here, as in Colombia, 
was to abolish the system of community landholding and to distribute the 
land to the Indians in individual ownership. There was a previous model 
for such legislation in a scheme inspired by the Spanish Cortes of 1812 and 
formulated by Viceroy Abascal in 1814.50 The plan was not put into effect, 
but it was evidently drawn from the same common stock of liberal thinking 
which animated Bolivar ten years later. 
His decree of 8 April 1824, issued in Trujillo, was intended primarily to 
promote agricultural production and raise revenue, but it also had social 
implications. The decree ordered that all state lands be offered for sale at 
one-third of the price of their real value. These were not to include lands in 
the possession of Indians, who were to be declared proprietors, with right 
to sell or alienate their lands in any way they wished; the Indian community 
lands were to be distributed among the landless occupants, especially to 
families, who were to be entitled to full legal ownership of their portions; 
and he insisted that no Indian should remain without land.51 But this 
attempt to turn the Indian peasantry into independent farmers was frus-
trated by landlords, caciques and officials, and in the following year at 
Cuzco Bolivar was obliged to issue a further decree (4 July 1825), re-
affirming and clarifying the first.52 This restored Indian land confiscated 
after the rebellion of 1814, ordered the distribution of community lands, 
regulated the method of distribution to include irrigation rights, and 
declared that the right freely to alienate their lands should not be exercised 
until after 1850, presumably in the belief that by then the Indians would 
have made sufficient progress to enable them to defend their interests. 
Bolivar supplemented these decrees with other measures designed to free 
the Indians from longstanding discrimination and in particular from labour 
services.53 He also abolished the hated tribute, but this was not uniformly 
observed, opponents arguing, with some insincerity, that the Indians lost 
by fiscal equality. 
The Indian decrees of Bolivar were limited in scope and misguided in 
intent. As the great haciendas already occupied most of the best land in 
Peru, these measures simply made the Indians more vulnerable, for to 
give them land without capital, equipment and protection was to invite 
them to become indebted to more powerful landowners, to surrender their 
land in payment, and to end up in debt peonage. And as the communities 
crumbled, the haciendas were waiting to sweep up the fragments of Indian 
society: the new policy gave them an added supply of cheap labour, while 
the colonial labour and tenancy forms, perpetuated by the republican 
regime, guaranteed its subordination. Bolivar's policy was not informed by 
deep understanding of Indian problems, only by ardent liberal ideals and 
passionate sympathy. T h e poor Indians are truly in a state of lamentable 
depression. I intend to help them all I can, first as a matter of humanity, 
second because it is their right, and finally because doing good costs 
nothing and is worth much'.54 But doing good was not enough, or not well 
defined, and the humanitarianism of the age of revolution was not in itself 
beneficial to Andean communities. 
7 
The economic thought of Bolivar favoured development within a new 
liberal framework, but his policy was frustrated by post-war conditions 
and by powerful interest groups. A stagnant agriculture and inadequate 
revenue were his major difficulties. These were the same problems with 
which the Physiocrats were concerned in the previous century. According 
to them, agriculture was the only economic activity which produced a net 
revenue, and so they favoured the promotion of a capitalist agriculture in 
place of small-scale farming. This involved the abolition of restrictions on 
the internal movement and export of agricultural products which depressed 
prices. It also meant the suppression of feudal privileges and reform of 
taxation, so that cultivators were not squeezed of their economic surplus 
and therefore disinclined to invest. The second source of economic liber-
alism was Adam Smith, who argued that existing restrictions resulted in 
the wrong distribution of resources, that is, away from agriculture. He 
therefore advocated free trade and a general programme of economic 
liberalism to remove restrictions on labour and land. A more immediate 
impetus to Bolivar's economic ideas was given by his own observation of 
the colonial economy and his opposition to the Spanish monopoly. 
Do you wish to know what our future was? We were mere consumers, confined 
to the cultivation of indigo, grain, coffee, sugar, cacao and cotton; raising cattle 
on the empty plains; hunting wild game in the wilderness; mining in the earth to 
produce gold for the insatiable greed of Spain.55 
Experience and enlightenment coincided to produce in Bolivar a belief 
in agricultural development, free trade, and the benefits of foreign invest-
ment. He was satisfied with a primary export role for Spanish America 
and was not unduly concerned for the survival of artisan industries or 
the achievement of economic self-sufficiency. But he was not a slave to 
economic liberalism and was never doctrinaire. He envisaged a larger and 
more positive role for the state than classical liberalism allowed, and to 
this extent he showed his awareness of the particular problems of under-
development. In the case of Colombia these were aggravated by a decade 
of destruction. 
War and revolution added further burdens to an already feeble econ-
omy. Drift of labour, loss of animals, flight of capital, all reduced Vene-
zuela and New Granada to new levels of depression and added to the 
problems of planners. Republican legislation guaranteed freedom of 
agriculture, industry and commerce without monopoly restrictions, and the 
government confined itself to providing the conditions in which private 
enterprise could operate. This was the theory. In practice laissez-faire had 
to be modified. Agriculture needed protection and encouragement. 
Bolivar urged Congress to prohibit the export of livestock in order to build 
up the national herds. He also wanted to free agriculture of the heavy 
duties imposed by the colonial regime, and he decreed the removal of 
tithes and export taxes. The Congress of Cucuta (1821) abolished internal 
customs barriers, the alcabala, and entails. But the fiscal system tended to 
revert to its colonial state, as more taxes were restored to finance the war 
effort and the post-war administration. The alcabala was revived in 1826, 
and its reduction from 5 to 4 per cent in 1828 was regarded as a concession 
designed to make Venezuelan exports more competitive.56 The alcohol 
estanco, abolished in 1826, was re-established in 1828; and the colonial 
tobacco monopoly continued as a major revenue until its abolition in 1850. 
It was clear to Bolivar that the surplus from agriculture, above all in 
the export sector, was not being reinvested in production. The tobacco 
revenue in particular was used as an all-purpose fund to meet an endless 
series of expenses. Bolivar was concerned that none of the profits of 
tobacco were being ploughed back into production. As his finance minister 
Rafael Revenga observed: 'far from thriving, the revenue will suffer if, 
instead of the income being used to promote production, as the Liberator 
has so often and urgently ordered, it is diverted to expenditure else-
where'.57 
In the absence of domestic accumulation, Bolivar looked abroad, and he 
made it known that foreign capital, entrepreneurs, and immigrants were 
welcome in the new republics. Few of these, however, were attracted to 
agriculture, and capital tended to concentrate in abortive mining projects. 
Bolivar had liberal ideas on immigration, and there were many colonisa-
tion and land company schemes in New Granada and Venezuela, but 
these foundered on the greed of entrepreneurs, who sought quick profits, 
and the reluctance of European immigrants to come as labourers.58 
Immigration policy contained glaring contradictions, not all of Bolivar's 
making. There was already a mass of landless peasants and llaneros in 
Colombia, but the state failed to implement adequately Bolivar's cherished 
scheme of land distribution. The landowning class, on the other hand, or 
some of it, received the further advantage of agricultural loans from the 
government. 
Independence ended the Spanish colonial monopoly, but foreign trade 
continued to be subject to restrictions, and there was nothing approaching 
true free trade. The tariff of 1826 imposed duties ranging from IV2 per cent 
to 36 per cent on most imports; this was primarily a revenue tariff but it 
also had a protective content to satisfy national economic interests; and 
state monopolies were protected by prohibition of the import of foreign 
tobacco and salt. There were also some export duties for revenue pur-
poses, though the country's export trade was hardly flourishing enough to 
sustain them. Colombia's production pattern remained the same; the 
principal items were coffee, cacao, tobacco, dyewoods and hides, with 
sugar and cotton on a smaller scale. The agriculturalists of northern 
New Granada, like those of coastal Venezuela, demanded and received 
protection for their plantation products. But the weaker wheat producers 
of the interior were not so protected against United States flour. And all 
agricultural production suffered from lack of investment capital, shortage 
of labour, poor communications and low prices on the international 
market. Bolivar soon realised that the economic problems of independence 
were more intractable than the military ones. 
The manufacturing sector was even more vulnerable than agriculture 
and could offer little resistance to British competition. Industries such as 
textiles could not compete with the flood of cheaper foreign goods, and 
Colombian industry now entered a period of crisis. The result was a further 
expansion of imports, while exports were confined to a moderate output 
of gold and silver from New Granada and a small trade in plantation 
products, chiefly cacao, tobacco and coffee. The trade gap was bridged by 
illegal export of precious metals and by foreign borrowings, the latter 
procured in adverse conditions, badly employed, and unreliably serviced. 
This eventually led to a limitation of imports by natural process. 
In these conditions there was some reaction against the early optimism 
of free trade opinion towards ideas of protection and state intervention, 
as could be seen in the thought of Juan Garcia del Rio and Jose Rafael 
Revenga, though protection in itself could do little for Colombia without 
the growth of consumers and the development of labour, capital and skill. 
Revenga, the economist most closely associated with Bolivar, attributed 
the decadence of industry in Venezuela to 
the excessive import of many articles which were previously produced by poor 
families here.... Foreign soap, for example, has destroyed the various soap 
factories which we formerly had in the interior. And now we even take candles 
from abroad, retailed at eight per real, and the few that are still made in this 
country actually import their wicks from abroad.... It is notorious that the more 
we rely on foreign interests to supply our needs, the more we diminish our 
national independence; and our reliance now even extends to daily and vital 
needs.59 
Revenga appreciated that Venezuela was not in a position to industrialise: 
'Our country is essentially agricultural; it will develop mining before 
manufactures; but it must strive to diminish its present dependence on 
foreign powers'.60 Bolivar was not unaware of the protectionist argument, 
coming as it did from Paez in Venezuela, manufacturers in New Granada, 
and the textile industry of Ecuador. To some extent he responded. The 
tendency of his tariff policy was towards higher duties, though these had a 
revenue as well as a protectionist purpose. And in 1829 he prohibited the 
import of certain foreign textiles. 
In the thought of Bolivar, however, there was little sign of that nation-
alist reaction to foreign penetration which later generations felt. While he 
rejected the Spanish economic monopoly, he welcomed foreigners who 
subscribed to open trade, who brought much needed manufactured goods 
and entrepreneurial skills, and who acquired an interest in preserving 
independence. Bolivar wanted yet feared British protection, sought yet 
avoided dependency. With a British alliance the new republics could 
survive; without it they would perish. By accepting British dominance, he 
argued, they could then grow strong and break free from it. 4We must bind 
ourselves body and soul to the English, to preserve at least the form of a 
legal and civil government, for to be governed by the Holy Alliance would 
mean a rule by conquerors and a military government'.61 His language 
became even more deferential. 'Politically', he wrote, 'alliance with Great 
Britain would be a greater victory than Ayacucho, and if we procure it you 
may be certain that our future happiness is assured. The advantages that 
will result for Colombia, if we ally ourselves with that mistress of the 
universe, are incalculable'.62 It made sense, of course, for a young and 
weak state to acquire a protector - and a liberal protector - against the 
Holy Alliance, especially as Britain itself had no political pretensions in 
Spanish America. But while it was expressed in political terms, depen-
dence could also have an economic application. 
Bolivar was prepared to invite a greater British economic presence in 
Latin America than later generations would find acceptable. 
Here [Peru], I have sold the mines for two and a half million pesos, and I expect 
to obtain far more from other sources. I have suggested to the Peruvian 
government that it sell in England all its mines, lands, properties and other 
government assets to cover the national debt, which is at least 20 million 
pesos.63 
British participation in the post-independence economies was considered 
essential and beneficial to both sides. The alternative, in Bolivar's view, 
was isolation and stagnation. This is not to say that he was complacent. 
He certainly saw the flaws in the Venezuelan economy and deplored the 
incipient trend towards monoculture. He believed that it was necessary 
to diversify production and to expand the range of exports. Venezuela 
depended too much, he argued, on coffee, whose price declined inexor-
ably throughout the 1820s and, in his view, would never improve. 'We 
must diversify or perish', he concluded.64 Bolivar accepted the bias to-
wards primary exports and simply sought to make it yield better results. 
There was a place for Spanish America in the age of industrial revolution, 
though it was necessarily a subordinate place, exchanging raw materials 
for manufactured goods and fulfilling a role conforming to its stage of 
development. 
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Spanish American independence did not resemble revolutionary move-
ments in Europe. These reflected conditions and claims which were 
appropriate to themselves but had only limited application to the political, 
social and economic problems of America. The European Enlightenment 
and its liberal aftermath were too self-absorbed to offer political ideas 
or services to colonial peoples. The economic interestsof industrial Europe, 
being those of a metropolis, involved some opportunities for primary 
producers but also disadvantages; and if industrialisation was a medium of 
social change in western Europe, it played no such role in early nineteenth-
century Spanish America, whose concern was to strengthen the traditional 
export sector - and with it the landed oligarchy - in order to import manu-
factures made by others. For these reasons Bolivar, who in many respects 
had a deep affinity with the age of revolution, could not imitate its intel-
lectual and political leaders even had he wished. 'Colombia is not France, 
and I am not Napoleon', he said.6"" While the Enlightenment confirmed 
his attachment to reason and inspired his struggle for liberty and equality, 
he had to employ his own intellectual resources to fashion a theory of 
colonial emancipation, and then to find the appropriate limits for liberty 
and equality, and in that process we can see traces of enlightened absol-
utism as well as of democratic revolution. Democratic forms in Europe and 
North America evoked his respect, but he insisted on writing his own 
constitutions, designed to conform to Spanish American conditions, not to 
outside models. These conditions, especially in the post-war period, when 
social heterogeneity, lack of consensus, and absence of political traditions 
placed liberal constitutions under severe strain and brought the new 
republics to the edge of anarchy, caused Bolivar, if not to abandon the 
search for liberty, at least to postpone it in favour of order and security. 
But Bolivarian absolutism was not an end in itself. The bias towards 
strong government, in the interests of reform as well as of order, and as a 
necessary framework for post-colonial development, was a quality rather 
than a flaw in Bolivar's policy, and endows him with a modernity beyond 
the confines of the age of revolution. 
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